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Abstract: Inequality and Justice are two important political values that have grabbed the 
attention of the political scientists. They have tried to demonstrate that the question of 
inequality and justice can be addressed through applying certain methods. For example, 
commodities approach, resource based approach, basic needs approach etc all make an 
attempt to demonstrate that inequality can be resolved. However, the paper argues that there 
are problems in these approaches and Sen’s argument on these approaches appear to be 
justified. The paper makes an modest attempt to look into these issues. 
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The central dilemma of political theory has 
been to resolve debates about normative 
ideals of equality and inequality. Political 
theory has engaged itself with questions of 
what we should be aiming at when we 
wish to make people more equal. Should 
norms of equality be conceived in terms of 
welfare, which entails reference to 
subjective evaluations or should goals of 
equality be directed at objective 
resources? Are concepts of the distribution 
of resources adequate for comparing 
objective well-being or do we need to 
conceptualize and compare what persons 
are capable of doing with these resources? 
The purpose of this paper is to probe into 
the contributions of different traditions of 
thought in political theory with special 
reference to the debate over inequality. 
The paper makes an attempt to analyze 
three approaches which discuss 
extensively on the issue of inequality. The 
approaches have been chosen keeping in 
mind the response of Amartya Sen. We 
have many other approaches or traditions 
in political theory which discuss on 
inequality. But Sen has not responded to 
these traditions. The approaches that we 
discuss here are a) commodities approach, 
b) utilitarian approach, c) basic needs 
approach. The following is an attempt to 
outline the major arguments of each of 
these approaches and how Sen has 
responded to these approaches. 
THE COMMODITIES APPROACH 
One way to define fundamental 
ethical categories is to identify certain 
goods or commodities as intrinsically good 
or ethically basic in some other way. 
Income, (per capita) GNP, and economic 
growth (in goods and services) were early 
favorites of postwar development 
economists and development practitioners. 
Let us call this version the crude 
commodity approach. This perspective has 
both strengths and weaknesses. It correctly 
understands that development does not 
occur without material prosperity. People 
cannot have well being or a good life 
without havingaccess to certain goods. 
Moreover, commodities can be both 
evidence for and causes of valuable human 
functionings. The commodity approach’s 
good idea goes bad when means are 
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transformed into ends. The result is what 
Sen calls, ‘commodity fetishism’.(Sen, 
1995) Instead of focusing on what goods 
can do for people or rather what people 
can do with these goods and services, the 
commodity approach often collapses into a 
valuation of goods themselves as 
intrinsically good.  
John Rawls has offered a more 
sophisticated account of addressing 
inequality. He evolves a procedure of 
justice which he calls as justice as 
fairness.(Rawls, 1999) As such, justice as 
fairness is a theory designed to apply to 
what Rawls calls the basic structure-the 
political, social and economic institutions 
of a society. It provides a normative ideal 
by which we are to judge the political 
constitution of society and the principal 
economic and social arrangements. The 
just society, according to justice as 
fairness, is one governed by the two 
principles of justice.(Farrelley, 2004) 
These principles are: 
 Each person has same indefensible 
claim to a fully adequate scheme of 
equal basic liberties which is 
compatible with the same scheme 
of liberties for all (equal basic 
liberties principle). 
 Social and economic inequalities 
are to satisfy two conditions. First, 
they are to be attached to offices 
and positions open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity (fair equality of 
opportunity principle); and second, 
they are to be to the greatest benefit 
of the least advantaged members of 
society (difference principle). The 
principles are presented in lexical 
order. This means that they are 
listed in order of priority. The 
equal basic liberties principle must 
be satisfied before the second 
principle is evoked and the fair 
equality of opportunity principle 
must be satisfied before the 
difference principle can be evoked.  
Rawls’ theory of justice invokes 
two main concepts of ethics-the right and 
the good- in order to illustrate how his 
contractrian theory differs from 
utilitarianism. The structure of an ethical 
theory is largely determined by how it 
defines and connects these two basic 
notions. Rawls distinguishes between right 
and the good in two ways. The first way is 
to define the good independently from the 
right and then the right as that which 
maximizes the good. For example, one 
defines the good as material prosperity. If 
we accept this definition of the good, then 
we can determine which laws and policies 
are the right ones by simply choosing the 
institutional arrangement which will bring 
about the greatest level of material 
prosperity. Institutions and acts are right if 
of the available alternatives, they produce 
the most good. Rawls calls this type of 
theory a teleological theory. It is 
contrasted with a deontological theory. 
Deontological theorycan be defined as a 
theory that either does not specify the good 
independently from the right, or does not 
interpret the right as maximizing the good. 
The appeal of the deontological 
position can be brought out by considering 
the example noted above. A teleological 
theory instructs us to maximize the good. 
If we define the good as material 
prosperity, for example, the institutions of 
our society will be designed to maximize 
overall material prosperity. But, such a 
goal may be pursued by measures, which 
we think as unjust. Maximizing overall 
material prosperity might justify restricting 
the number of children people can have or 
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denying the terminally ill expensive health 
care provisions. By asserting a priority of 
the right over the good, Rawls seeks to 
avoid the injustices that may be made in 
the name of maximizing utility. Rawls 
argues that each person possesses an 
inviolability founded on justice that even 
the welfare of society as a whole cannot 
override.(Pogge, 2007) 
The main target of Rawls critique 
is the classical utilitarian doctrine 
espoused by Jeremy Bentham and Henry 
Sidgwick. This version maintains that 
society is just when its major institutions 
are arranged in such a way so as to achieve 
the greatest satisfaction of greatest 
numbers.(Pogge, 2007) Rawls believes 
that we must begin with some criteria to 
determine which principles should govern 
the main institutions of our society. Rawls 
claims that there is a limited class of facts 
against which conjectured principles can 
be checked. This class of fact comprises 
the considered judgments concerning what 
constitutes a just society. Our moral 
sensibilities tell us that acts of murder, 
slavery and discrimination, for example, 
are acts that our institutions should seek to 
prevent and in cases where they do occur, 
the perpetrators should be appropriately 
punished. Any theory of justice that 
conflicts with these judgments will be 
rejected. For example, a theory that 
permits denying ethnic minorities the right 
to vote will fail to secure our approval. 
One of our most firmly entrenched beliefs 
concerning justice is that, all citizens 
should be entitled to the right to vote, 
regardless of their race, religion or gender. 
A theory that cannot accommodate such 
widely shared belief fails to provide a 
viable account of the demands of justice.  
The appeal to a shared 
understanding of what justice demands is 
an important aspect of Rawls theory. 
When constructing a theory, we must start 
somewhere and Rawls wants to start with 
general and widely accepted premises, 
which reflect the considered judgments of 
citizens of a democratic society. These 
judgments serve as the moral data from 
which we are to construct and test a 
theory of justice. A theory that blatantly 
violates one of these convictions will fail 
to be a viable theory. While Rawls 
endorses appealing to some shared beliefs 
in the initial stages of his theory, he is 
quick to point out that he does not appeal 
to values that violate what he calls the 
fact of reasonable pluralism. This is the 
fact of profound and irreconcilable 
differences in citizens’ comprehensive 
religious and philosophical conceptions of 
the world and in their views of the moral 
and aesthetic values to be sought in 
human life. Citizens affirm aesthetic 
values to be sought in human life. 
Citizens affirm diverse and often 
competing conceptions of what is of value 
in life. An appeal to contentious claims 
concerning, for example, what the Bible 
says regarding the sexual relations 
between a man and a women, goes well 
beyond the shared judgments of citizens 
in a free democratic society. Rawls does 
not provide an exhaustive list of what 
these initial shared assumptions are. Nor 
does he claim that our initial convictions 
are exempt from scrutiny. On the 
contrary, once we begin to consider the 
complexities of issues raised by different 
conceptions of justice, we will find that 
we revise or perhaps even abandon some 
of the initial convictions we began with. 
What we seek is parity between the 
principles of justice and our considered 
judgments. This is what Rawls calls 
reflective equilibrium.Reflective 
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equilibrium is a state of balance or 
coherence among a set of beliefs arrived 
at by a process of deliberative mutual 
adjustment among general principles and 
particular judgments. Rawls argues that 
human beings have a “sense of justice” 
which is both a source of moral judgment 
and moral motivation. In Rawls’s theory, 
we begin with “considered judgments” 
that arise from the sense of justice. These 
may be judgments about general moral 
principles (of any level of generality) or 
specific moral cases. If our judgments 
conflict in some way, we proceed by 
adjusting our various beliefs until they are 
in “equilibrium,” which is to say that they 
are stable, not in conflict, and provide 
consistent practical guidance. Rawls 
argues that a set of moral beliefs in ideal 
reflective equilibrium describes or 
characterizes the underlying principles of 
the human sense of justice. 
While Rawls does not provide an 
exhaustive list of what these initial 
assumptions are, he does invoke certain 
fundamental ideas which are embedded in 
the public political culture of a democratic 
society.(Farrelley, 2004)  
These include the following: 
(a) The idea of society as a fair system 
of social cooperation over time 
from one generation to the next. 
(b) The idea of citizens as free and 
equal persons. As such, they are 
taken to possess two moral powers. 
First, the capacity for a sense of 
justice, i.e.  the capacity to 
understand, to apply and to act 
from (and not merely in accordance 
with) the principles of political 
justice that specify the fair terms of 
social cooperation. Second, persons 
have a capacity for a conception of 
the good i.e. the capacity to have, 
revise and rationally to pursue a 
conception of the good.(Farrelley, 
2004) 
Rawls invokes the original position to 
justify these above arguments. The original 
position is a hypothetical choice situation. 
It corresponds to the state of nature in 
traditional contract theories. Parties are 
placed in the original position and given 
two tasks. First, the individuals have to 
choose the principles that are to govern the 
basic structure of society. Second, to 
choose the principles which can be applied 
to individuals. They are also given a 
limited list of principles from which to 
choose. This list includes Rawls’ two 
principles of justice and their priority 
rules, utilitarianism and perfectionism. 
Rawls describes the original position as 
the appropriate initial status quo in which 
all people are treated as equals. In order to 
be so, certain conditions must hold. In 
everyday life, a number of unfair factors 
influence agreements that we want to rule 
out in the original position. For example, 
unfair bargaining advantages, threats of 
force and coercion, and deception and 
fraud. In order to ensure that the voice of 
principles of justice is impartial and fair 
Rawls invokes the following two 
constraints.  
1. The principle must fulfill what he 
calls the formal constraints of the 
right.  
2. They must be chosen behind a veil 
of ignorance. From behind the veil 
of ignorance, the parties are denied 
certain information which will 
ensure that they evaluate principles 
solely on the basis of general 
considerations. The parties do not 
know the following information. 
 Their place in society 
 Their race or gender 
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 Their fortune in the distribution 
of natural assets and abilities  
 Their conception of the good 
 The particular circumstances of 
their society 
 The generation they belong to 
The only facts the parties do know 
are general facts about society (for 
example, principles of economic theory 
and laws of human psychology) and that 
their society is subject to the circumstances 
of justice.(Farelley, 2004) 
If the parties do not know their 
conception of the good then on what basis 
they will decide the principles? Rawls 
claims that the parties have some rational 
plan of life; they just do not know what the 
details of this plan are. In order to ensure 
that individuals have the opportunity to 
pursue their conception of the good in the 
real world, once the veil is lifted, the 
parties in the original position seek to 
secure the largest share they can Rawls 
calls these as social primary goods. These 
goods are rights and liberties, powers and 
opportunities, income and wealth and self-
respect.  
However, Rawls had to face lot of 
criticisms because of his excessive focus on 
primary goods. Critics pointed out the 
inflexibility of his primary goods. So, he 
tried to respond his critics with a modified 
version through his book Political 
Liberalism. In political liberalism, Rawls 
introduces some new vocabulary. He now 
talks about ‘reasonable persons’, ‘public 
reason’, the rational and the reasonable and 
the ‘burdens of judgment’. The extent to 
which these terms represent a substantial 
change to Rawls theory as opposed to 
simply clarifying aspects of his original 
theory is debatable. One idea that has 
become more central to Rawls’ revised 
theory is the idea of an overlapping 
consensus. Rawls claims that a political 
conception of justice is the object of an 
overlapping consensus of reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines. He describes a 
political conception as a module, an essential 
constituent part that fits into and can be 
supported by various reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines that endure in the 
society regulated by it.  
Dworkin on Equality of Resources 
Ronald Dworkin is an egalitarian 
thinker whose main concern is with 
distributional equality and he considers two 
general theories-equality of welfare and 
equality of resources.  Equality of welfare 
stands for a distributional scheme which 
treats people as equals when it distributes or 
transfers resources among them until no 
further transfer would leave them more 
equal in welfare. Equality of resources 
stands for a distributional scheme which 
treats people as equals when it distributes or 
transfers so that no further transfer would 
leave their shares of the total resources more 
equal.(Dworkin, 2002) 
The idea of equality of welfare is 
appealing because it accepts the principles 
of ethical individualism. Dworkin 
emphasizes the principle of equal 
importance which is one of the important 
principles of ethical individualism.(Cohen, 
1989) Consider, for example, how people 
with handicaps would be treated in this 
society. Their welfare is just as important 
as the welfare of those who do not have 
handicaps. Thus, whose welfare is 
impeded by such burdens will receive 
extra resources so that they can enjoy the 
same level of welfare as others. Equality of 
welfare thus supports the principle of equal 
importance because it requires that the 
needy receive more resources.(Cohen, 
1989) But, equality of welfare fails to 
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accommodate the second principle which 
Dworkin takes to be fundamental, the 
principle of special responsibility. If 
equality of welfare is the goal, then it 
cannot provide sufficient room for the idea 
that we have special and final 
responsibility for the success of our lives. 
My welfare might be impeded not because 
of factors beyond my control. Perhaps I 
have cultivated expensive tastes and thus 
need extra resources in order for me to 
achieve the same level of welfare that 
others have. According to equality of 
welfare my demand for extra resources, 
like those of the person with a handicap, is 
legitimate. Equality of welfare fails as a 
distributive ideal because it does not afford 
enough room for considerations of 
personal responsibility. Like Rawls’s 
difference principle, equality of welfare 
fails to distinguish between the deserving 
and undesrving poor. Dworkin puts for his 
account of equality of resources as an 
alternative distributive ideal that 
incorporates both the principle of equal 
importance and the principle of special 
responsibility.(Cohen, 1989) 
Dworkin’s argument for equality of 
resources is a rich and sophisticated one 
and we can only briefly consider some of 
its main components. Dworkin makes an 
attempt to merge the two fundamental 
principles of ethical individualism through 
the hypothetical tale of shipwrecked 
survivors who are washed up on a desert 
island that has abundant resources. Let us 
assume for the moment that everyone have 
the same natural talents. The immigrants 
agree to divide the resources of the island 
equally among them. Each person is given 
100 clam shells to bid on the various 
resources. These people will obviously 
have different preferences and this will be 
reflected in what they spend their clam 
shells on. If the majority of immigrants 
have a preference for sun tanning on the 
beach then those parts of the beach will be 
very costly. If the majority have a 
preference for living as farmers, then those 
parts of the island conducive to agriculture 
will be very costly. The distribution that 
would result from such an auction would 
be ambition sensitive. That is, the bundle 
of goods people end up with would reflect 
only the choices they made. No one could 
complain that someone else received 
preferential treatment as all started with 
100 clam shells and were free to bid on 
those resources they wanted. Of course, 
some resources will be more expensive 
than others, but this is not a ground for a 
complaint as this stems from our personal 
preferences and those of the other 
immigrants. We could change our 
preferences so that we could appropriate 
more of the less expensive resources. Such 
an auction will treat all as equals if it 
satisfies what Dworkin calls the envy test. 
The envy test maintains that no division of 
resources is an equal division if, once the 
distribution is complete, any immigrant 
would prefer someone else’s bundle of 
resources to his own bundle. 
The first part of Dworkin’s 
hypothetical story captures the concern for 
the special responsibility principle. The 
initial bundle of goods the immigrants 
have are the result of their own ambitions, 
tastes, etc. Things take an interesting turn 
once the auction is completed and the 
immigrants begin to produce things. Given 
the fact that some immigrants will be more 
skillful, others will fall sick, etc, it will not 
be long before the conditions of the envy 
test will fail to be met. These events thus 
threaten to undermine the first 
fundamental principle of ethical 
individualism-the principle of equal 
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importance. This principle maintains that 
it is important that human lives be 
successful rather than wasted. Dworkin 
argues that we must not allow the 
distribution of resources to be endowment-
sensitive that is to be affected by 
differences in ability of the sort that 
produce income differences in a laissez-
faire economy among people with the 
same ambitions.  
Dworkin introduces the 
hypothetical insurance scheme to alleviate 
the concerns about abandoning the ideal of 
an endowment-insensitive distribution. He 
modifies the auction story by declaring 
that, prior to the auction, the immigrants 
are denied information about their natural 
endowments. They are given the 
opportunity to purchase insurance against 
handicaps and unequal skills. Under these 
conditions of uncertainty, people would be 
willing to part with some of their 100 clam 
shells to guard against having disabilities 
or lacking skills. Such schemes will be 
funded by those who are fortunate not to 
have to make an insurance claim but will 
have to pay an insurance premium.   
The hypothetical auction Dworkin 
invokes, is likely to cause some confusion 
in terms of understanding how it relates to 
the real world, where we don’t begin with 
equal resources nor do we have insurance 
schemes in place for things like skill. 
Dworkin attempts to make the link 
between the theory and the real world by 
tackling a number of applied topics in 
second part of Sovereign Virtue, including 
health care, welfare programmes, electoral 
reform and affirmative action.(Dworkin, 
2002) In the real world, for example, there 
is a need for taxation and redistribution. 
Income tax is a device; society can use to 
neutralize the effects of handicaps and 
differential talents. But a tax system can 
only roughly approximate the results of the 
insurance scheme and will not achieve a 
truly ambition sensitive/endowment 
insensitive distribution. Nor is there one 
simple solution which will do justice to the 
demands of the two fundamental principles 
of ethical individualism. Dworkin 
endorses, for example, a decent minimum 
of medical care for all citizens and the 
option to buy private health insurance. But 
his endorsement of universal health 
coverage is not founded on the rescue 
principle, which instructs us to spend all 
we can on health care until the next dollar 
would buy no gain in health and life 
expectancy at all. Equal concern for all 
does not necessarily entail that we spend 
exorbitant amounts of public funds trying 
to save the lives of those who have little 
chance of surviving for long. Society must 
be deemed necessary and appropriate for 
coverage under the publicly funded health 
care system and also allow individuals to 
choose for themselves how much more 
they wish to spend to insure themselves 
against other possible misfortunes. Such 
an arrangement is a just compromise 
between the demands of equal importance 
and special responsibility.(Arneson, 1989) 
Amartya Sen and Martha 
Nussbaum have offered four criticisms 
against commodities approach.  
First, Sen and Nussbaum appeal to 
our considered judgments that 
commodities are not intrinsically good. 
They are good because of the relationship 
they have with individuals. In other words, 
both of them are actually criticizing the 
commodity fetishism aspect of this 
approach. Commodities have values 
because individuals attach meaning to 
them.  
Second, due to variations among 
individuals, the same commodity either 
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may help some and harm others or may 
promote well being of some a lot and 
others a little. Although food intake 
normally will enhance human 
functionings, it will kill person choking on 
a fish bone. To function well, Milo the 
wrestler needs, on one hand, more food 
than the infant and the disabled and on the 
other hand, less food than a wrestler of 
similar size but stricken with parasites. 
Pregnant or lactating women have 
different nutritional requirements than they 
need before the conception or after the 
birth of their children.(Sen, 1995) Not only 
does the usefulness of given commodity 
vary among persons but also the same 
human functioning can be promoted, even 
in the same society, by various goods or 
differing packages of goods. Sen calls this 
a correspondence between commodities 
bundles and given capabilities.(Sen, 1995) 
Being adequately nourished can result 
from radically different diets. Being in 
good health can be promoted by different 
properties of good food and preventive or 
curative medical care. A concept of human 
well being that focuses on goods rather 
than persons inevitably neglects the 
variable conversion of goods into valuable 
human functionings and capabilities.(Sen, 
1988) 
Third criticism as explained by Sen 
is societal rather than individual. A focus 
on commodities easily leads to a kind of 
cultural relativity or conventionality. For 
example, the clothing that promotes basic 
functioning differs in Kashmir and the 
mining areas of Jharkhand. The important 
point is that the capabilities approach can 
retain the notion of a culturally invariant 
core to both well being and deprivation 
while at the same time, constructing any 
specific means of provisioning as relative 
to historical and cultural contexts.  
Nussbaum, drawing on Aristotle, 
states a fourth criticism of the commodities 
approach.(Nussbaum, 1992) In many 
instances, goods can be bad when we get 
too much of them. More or bigger is not 
always better. Too much of good thing can 
be bad. Goods and the hunger for them 
often makes people excessively 
competitive, domineering, arrogant and 
have a mercenary attitude towards other 
kinds of good things. This attitude can go 
so far as to result in what Nussbaum calls a 
commodification of parts of the self in 
which women’s bodies, for example are 
treated as commodities in market 
transactions and in legal proceedings 
concerning rape. In this connection, one 
might also mention body building and 
beauty contests as well as the increasing 
use of steroids and cosmetic surgery.  
 
THE WELFARE (UTILITARIAN) 
APPROACH 
The commodities approach, 
whether crude or Rawlsian, 
overemphasizes goods and neglects 
people. The welfare approach, of which 
utilitarianism is a prime example, 
overemphasizes people’s mental states and 
neglects other aspects of their well being. 
It does advance beyond the commodity 
approach by interpreting human well being 
and good development as a feature of 
persons themselves. It goes astray, 
however, by paying exclusive attention to 
only one aspect of human well being, 
namely utility. Utilitarianism in its 
simplest form claims that the morally right 
act or policy is that which produces the 
greatest happiness for the members of 
society. There are two major attractions of 
utilitarianism.(Kymilka, 2002) First, the 
goal which utilitarians seek to promote 
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does not depend on the existence of God or 
any metaphysical entity.  
Second, consequentialism is 
another attraction of 
utilitarianism.(Kymilka, 2002) In simple 
words, consequentialism prohibits 
arbitrary moral restrictions. To clarify 
further, our acts have to be judged by the 
consequences. For example, somebody 
would say drinking alcohol is bad if she 
fails to produce any bad consequences that 
arise from it. Consequentialism says that 
something is morally good only if it makes 
someone’s life better off. Utilitarianism 
provides a test to ensure that such rules 
serve some useful function.(Kymilka, 
2002) 
Utilitarians have traditionally 
defined utility in terms of happiness. But 
there exists lot of internal debate among 
the utilitarian as to how to define 
happiness. One school believes that the 
experience of pleasure is the central human 
good. Bentham belongs to this school of 
thought. This is called hedonistic account 
of well being. Similarly, there are 
philosophers who argue that many 
different kinds of experiences are valuable 
and that we should promote the entire 
range of valuable mental states. Nozik is 
very critical of these two accounts of well 
being. He points his fingers towards the 
experience machine. He argues that 
because of drug effect we may get pleasure 
or mentally fit. But this is not good for 
health. 
There is another variety of 
utilitarianism which believes in the 
preference satisfaction account of utility. 
In this view, increasing people’s utility 
means satisfying their preferences, 
whatever they are. But the question is 
whether preferences define our good. But 
the question is to what extent preferences 
define our good? Because, we do not know 
in most cases, which preferences will do 
good to us. The last account of utility tries 
to accommodate the problem of mistaken 
and adaptive preferences by defining 
welfare as the satisfaction of rational or 
informed preferences. Utilitarianism on 
this view, aims at satisfying those 
preferences which are based on full 
information and correct judgments, while 
filtering out those which are mistaken and 
irrational. We seek to provide those things 
which people have good reason to prefer, 
that really make their life better off. But 
this view is extremely vague.  
Some critics have concluded that 
for this reason, utilitarianism must be 
rejected. If we accept the fourth view of 
welfare as the satisfaction of informed 
preferences, and if welfare cannot be 
clearly identified or aggregated on that 
view, then there is no way to know which 
act maximizes welfare, and we need some 
other account of the morally right act.  
To be sure, utilitarianism as a 
political philosophy requires that we be 
able to compare utility gains and losses 
across lives, not just within a particular 
life. In order to decide who should be 
given scarce resources, we may need to 
judge whether A’s political fulfillment 
outweighs B’s disappointment. This is the 
problem of the interpersonal comparability 
of utility and some people think that, even 
if we can make rational judgments about 
how to maximize utility within a single 
life, we cannot do so across lives. We 
cannot get inside other people’s heads to 
know whether our fulfillments and 
disappointment are greater of less than 
theirs.  
But while utilitarians seek to treat 
people as equals, it violates many of our 
intuitions about what it genuinely believes 
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to treat people with equal consideration. 
Utilitarianism misinterpreted the ideal of 
equal consideration for each person’s 
interests and as a result, it allows some 
people to be treated as less than equals, as 
means to other people’s ends.(Farelley, 
2004) 
For Rawls, it is a defining feature 
of our sense of justice that interests which 
require the violation of justice, have no 
value. So, the presence of illegitimate 
preferences cannot distort our claims upon 
one another. Justice limits the admissible 
conceptions of the good so that those 
conceptions the pursuit of which violates 
the principles of justice are ruled out 
absolutely. The claims to pursue 
inadmissible conceptions have no weight 
at all. Because, unfair preferences never 
enter into the social calculus, people’s 
claims are made secure from the 
unreasonable demands of others. For 
utilitarians, on the other hand, no 
restrictions grounded on right and justice 
is imposed on the ends through which 
satisfaction is to be achieved.  
Utilitarianism fails to recognize 
special relationships or to exclude 
illegitimate preferences. In each case, 
utilitarianism is interpreting equal 
consideration in terms of the aggregation 
of pre-existing preferences, whatever they 
are for, even if they invade the rights or 
commitments of others. But our intuitions 
tell us that equality should enter into the 
very formation of our preferences. Part of 
what it means to show equal consideration 
for others is taking into account what 
rightfully belongs to them in deciding on 
one’s goals in life. Hence, prejudiced and 
selfish preferences are excluded from the 
start, for they already reflect a failure to 
show equal consideration. However, if my 
goals do respect other people’s rightful 
claims, then I am free to pursue special 
relationships, even if some other act 
maximizes utility. In my plans respect the 
teachings of equality there is nothing 
wrong with giving priority to my family or 
career. This means that my day to day 
activities will show equal concern.  I will 
care more about helping my friends, or the 
causes I am committed to, than about 
helping the goals of other people. And that 
is entirely acceptable, so long as I respect 
the claims of others concerning the pursuit 
of their subjects.  
If we think about the values that 
motivate utilitarianism, the values which 
give it its initial plausibility we will see 
that it must be modified. Utilitarianism is 
initially attractive because human beings 
matter and matter equally. But, the goal of 
equal consideration that utilitarians seek to 
implement is best implemented by an 
approach that includes a theory of fair 
shares.(Kymilka, 2002) Such a theory 
would excuse prejudiced or selfish 
preferences that ignores the rightful claims 
of others, but would allow for the kind of 
special commitments that are part of our 
very idea of leading a life. These 
modifications do not conflict with the 
general principle of consequentialism, but 
rather stem from it. They are refinements 
of the general idea that morality should be 
about the welfare of human beings. 
Utilitarianism has simply oversimplified 
the way in which we intuitively believe 
that the welfare of others is worthy of 
moral concern.  
In objecting to welfarism, Sen is 
criticizing one component of the utilitarian 
moral theory that undergirds much of 
neoclassical and continues to function as a 
dominant outlook in philosophical ethics. 
Sen distinguishes three features of 
utilitarianism.(Alkire, 2002) 
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(a) Consequentialism: The rightness of 
actions and more generally of the 
choice of all control variables must 
be judged entirely by the goodness 
of the consequent state of affairs.  
(b) Welfarism: The goodness of states 
of affairs must be judged entirely 
by the goodness of the set of 
individual utilities in the respective 
states of affairs.  
(c) Sum-ranking: The goodness of any 
set of individual utilities must be 
judged entirely by their sum total. 
Sen is sympathetic to a broadly 
conceived consequentialism especially if it 
is able to accommodate rights respecting 
actions in the states of affairs to be 
evaluated. What he finds morally 
problematic in utilitarianism is its 
welfarism and its method of sum ranking.    
Sen recognizes that welfarism 
comes in different forms depending on 
whether individual utility is interpreted as 
happiness, desire fulfillment or choice 
between options. For our purpose, it will 
suffice to concentrate on Sen’s evaluation 
of the happiness and the desire fulfillment 
interpretations.  
Sen identifies two fundamental 
shortcomings in welfarism. First, well 
being is not the only thing that is valuable. 
Welfarism conceives of humans as no 
more than sites of certain mental states. 
This angle of vision unfortunately 
abstracts from what Sen calls the agency 
aspect of the person. Humans are not only 
experiencers or preference satisfiers; they 
are also judges, evaluators and doers. They 
decide on and revise their conceptions of 
the good as well as satisfy desires based on 
those conditions. And these basic aims 
often go well beyond the agent’s pursuit of 
utility. Here Sen is trying to do justice to 
Kantian emphasis on agency and 
autonomy. For, Sen agency and well being 
are two fundamental and irreducible 
dimensions of being human.  
Second, Sen has presented 
powerful arguments against the way 
utilitarians try to understand well being. 
Utilitarians argue that well being is 
measured in terms of individual happiness. 
But, happiness or desire fulfillment is not 
sufficient for well being and is woefully 
inaccurate as a measure of human well 
being.(Sen, 1995) We need a perspective 
that is concerned with what people are able 
to do and be, where being happy or getting 
what they desire is only one valuable 
capability among others.  
 
THE BASIC NEEDS APPROACH 
(BNA) 
The basic needs approach to 
international development, as worked out 
in the 1970’s and 1980s by development 
economists and policy makers such as Paul 
Strrten, Frances Stewart and Mahbub Ul 
Haq, draws attention in an immediate and 
powerful way, to the importance of the 
type of life,  that people are able to lead. It 
is both an important breakthrough and 
perspective for a deeper and more secure 
foundation of human development. Sen 
offers his capability approach just an 
improvement over the BNA.  
BNA criticizes those approaches 
that define development in relation to the 
economic growth-even the equitable 
economic growth of commodities or 
utilities. Economic and societal 
development is a matter of human well 
being, which in turn is a function of 
meeting certain basic or human needs. We 
cannot really say that a society is 
developed unless it promotes a good life 
for all its citizens and affords them the 
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freedom to choose it. Streeten himself put 
it eloquently: “A basic needs approach to 
development attempts to provide the 
opportunities for the full physical, mental 
and social development of the human 
personality and then derives the ways of 
achieving this objective”.( Streeten, 1997) 
Sen also defends the BNA against 
the objection that economic growth and 
meeting needs are mutually exclusive, that 
a basic needs perspective inevitably 
reduces a country’s economic growth and 
material prosperity. Although strongly 
sympathetic, Sen makes five criticisms of 
the BNA. They are as follows: 
(1) The foundations criticism 
(2) The individual variability criticism 
(3) The social interdependence  
(4) The minimalist criticism 
(5) The passivity criticism 
Sen’s first criticism of the BNA is 
that it lacks an adequate foundation. The 
BNA has failed to resolve the unsettled 
question of what among conflicting 
interpretations, should be meant by the 
appeal to needs. Is need satisfaction 
important because of the mental state of 
satisfaction? This would fall back into 
welfarism. Is meeting needs reducible to 
providing people with certain amounts of 
commodities? If so, then the BNA 
becomes a new version of commodity 
fetishism. The BNA has often failed to 
consider whether the category of needs is 
morally ultimate. It has failed to clarify the 
nature and variety of needs and to justify it 
as a moral category more fundamental than 
commodities, utilities and rights.(Sen, 
1995) 
Sen argues that the BNA can 
advance explicitly by raising the question 
of foundations and answering it by 
interpreting needs as capabilities. The 
focus must be on certain intrinsically 
valuable human achievements, such as 
“being healthy, being well nourished, 
being literate and being able to freely 
choose to lead a particular life. If we 
interpret basic needs as intrinsically 
valuable functionings and capability to 
function, we will find a concept of human 
well being and flourishing that is morally 
appropriate, conceptually fundamental and 
operationally practical. We will be able to 
accomplish the original aim of the BNA 
without falling back into either commodity 
fetishism or utility subjectivism.(Sen, 
1995) 
In fact, according to Sen, the BNA 
has often collapsed into a commodities 
approach and hence is subject to the 
criticisms of commodity fetishism.1 The 
human need for food has tended to be 
replaced by a focus on the food needed. 
Although, the BNA recognized in principle 
that different amounts of the same 
commodity were needed by different 
individuals, it tended operationally to 
define basic needs in terms of food, water, 
shelter, and hospital beds. Sen especially 
underscores what we called earlier his 
interpersonal variability argument. My 
main difficulty has been with the way 
basic needs are typically defined in terms 
of needs for commodities, and that I think 
is problematic, because of the enormity of 
interpersonal variations in converting 
commodities into capabilities. Moreover, 
according to Sen, the BNA largely 
neglected the correspondence between 
commodities and capabilities: even in the 
same individual, the same functioning 
often can be achieved by more than one 
bundle of goods and services. The BNA, 
then has not been able to exercise the ghost 
of commodity fetishism. This failure, Sen 
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appears to imply, is traceable to the 
theoretical failure of the BNA to carve out 
a distinctive space for the concept of 
needs.  
The social interdependence 
argument as explained by Sen is rather 
tentative and underdeveloped. A BNA will 
stress human needs for certain 
commodities. Even with respect to the 
need for food, it will be difficult to specify 
a bundle or amount of food stuff 
absolutely or in a culturally and 
individually invariant way. The problem is 
only compounded when we move to such 
important capabilities as being able to 
appear in public without shame or take 
part in community life. These sorts of 
achievements and capabilities make 
essential reference to the actions or 
judgments of other people. The 
commodity requirements for certain 
capabilities are not just a matter of 
matching a certain commodity with an 
isolated individual but must take into 
account social interdependence. A 
particular person’s capability to appear in 
public without shame will make essential 
and substantial reference to the culturally 
relative judgments or evaluations of other 
social members concerning what counts as 
acceptable apparel.  
Sen’s third objection to the BNA, 
the minimalist criticism makes a 
distinction between basic and non basic 
needs and then interprets basic needs in 
terms of commodities such as food, water, 
shelter required to meet those needs. The 
focus would be on meeting minimum 
needs and not more. Sen finds two defects 
in this focus on a quantitative threshold, 
both of which, he claims, and his 
capability approach avoids. First, the focus 
on quantitatively minimal levels 
unfortunately restricts the BNA to 
evaluating deprived individuals and poor 
countries. More comprehensive and less 
biased would be an approach that permits 
the degree of advantage or well being of 
any individual and the degree of 
development of all countries and regions. 
Moreover, regardless of how many 
individuals fall below some social floor, it 
is also desirable to focus on the 
unacceptable inequalities within and 
between nations. One way to do so is to 
signify something different by basic 
capability than the BNA intends by basic 
need. The latter is quantitative threshold 
that one must be above if one is to survive 
or live decently. The former is a qualitative 
evaluation of what sorts of functioning are 
most valuable. What continues to be useful 
in the notion of threshold, and what Sen 
himself will employ with respect to his 
notion of basic rights, is that good 
government will ensure that all social 
members, by crossing this threshold, are 
able to choose 
 to lead a life of valuable functioning. A 
capability approach, however, is also 
useful whenever we want to discuss 
various degrees of deprivation and 
development within and among countries.   
The second and related defect in 
the BNA’s concept of a minimal threshold 
is that the haves, whether individuals or 
nations, easily can get the mistaken notion 
that their moral responsibilities are over 
when certain quantitatively minimal levels 
of need satisfaction are attained-regardless 
of whether or not there are such things as 
opportunities for valuable functioning or 
inequalities incompatible with self respect. 
The capability approach claims Sen, does 
not lend itself to this excessive contraction 
of moral responsibility and is open to 
formulating justice as equality of 
capabilities. It appears to me that Sen does 
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succeed in showing the superiority of his 
approach to earlier versions of the BNA. 
What is not so clear whether the same 
advances could made in a perspective such 
as Nussbaum’s in which, to use Sen’s 
language, the space of needs was not 
altogether interpreted or replaced by the 
space of capabilities.  
The third criticism put forward by 
Amartya Sen is known as passivity 
criticism. Agents must do certain things to 
meet the needs of beneficiaries who 
unfortunately are at least temporarily 
passive. Sen’s point is that a capability 
ethic enables us to say that good public 
action does not always do things to passive 
receiptants but increases people’s choices 
and enhances people’s capabilities, 
including their capability of choice. 
Adults, right now and children, in the 
future, are assumed to be moral agents, 
and genuine social development aims to 
provide the conditions which they 
themselves acquire expanded and valuable 
capabilities, including that of substantial 
choice.  
Sen admits that his proposal is 
different only in emphasis, presumably 
because a BNA can include on the list of 
basic needs such things as a need for self-
reliance, self-help, and autonomous 
choice. To meet or fulfill other basic needs 
can then be interpreted as empowering the 
receiptants-with various sorts of aid- to 
meet their need of autonomous, self reliant 
action and thereby develop connotations of 
the BNA, which can be replaced with 
expressions that suggest receiptant 
activity, without denying the liberating 
role that external help can play.  
To sum up, I have argued that the 
existing approaches to inequalities have 
serious dilemmas and contradictions. The 
commodities approach lacks the diversity 
element which is required to meet the 
norms of diverse societies. The 
inflexibility of this approach makes it 
vulnerable to neoliberal societies. The 
welfare approach wrongly conceives the 
notion of well being. The idea that human 
well being can be measured has lot of 
negative implications for the human 
society. Sen has advanced two reasons for 
rejecting the welfare approach. First, 
welfare approach ignores the ‘agency’ 
aspect of human being. Second, the idea of 
well being is not pronounced in a 
comprehensive manner. It is a serious 
mistake to equate well being with 
individual happiness. Similarly, the basic 
needs approach lacks the foundations and 
sometimes it falls into the trap of 
commodity fetishism. There is a need to 
expand the scope of ‘basic needs’. 
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